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Civil Procedure
Henry G. McMahon*
ABATEMENT OF ACTIONS

Interesting differences of approach have characterized the
solution by the common law and various civilian jurisdictions of
procedural problems created by the death of a party during the
pendency of a personal action.
"At common law, all pending personal actions abated on
the death of a party. If the cause of action itself survived, a
new action could be commenced by or against the personal
representatives of the deceased party. Tort actions did not
survive the death of either party. An action did not lie for
the recovery of damages for wrongful death."'
Developments in this area of Anglo-American law during the
past century have consisted largely of statutory abrogation of
these harsh common law rules. 2
Conversely, under Roman law
"death played a much lesser role in preventing the enforcement of delictual and quasi-delictual obligations than it
played under abatement of actions and survival of causes of
action at common law. ... [T] he right of action on all quasidelicts, and on all delicts except injuria, on the death of the
injured person devolved on his heirs. Originally, these actions could not be brought against the heirs of the wrongdoer; but this harsh result was mitigated later through the
adoption of the rule that the wrongdoer's heirs were liable
for his commission of a delict, to the extent that the estate
had been enriched thereby. The full extent to which extinction of actions by the death of a party was avoided under
Roman law, however, cannot be accurately gauged without
taking into account the effect of the litis contestatio. Litiscontestation worked a procedural novation of the right of
9. 229 La. 951, 87 So.2d 303 (1956).
10. Succession of Henderson, 211 La. 707, 30 So.2d 809 (1947).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Comment, Abatement of Actions in Louisiana, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

722 (1955).
2. Id. at 722, 723.
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action and the obligation by the action itself. After litis
contestatio, the action was not extinguished by the death of
the party; and even the actio injuriarum,after this stage of
the proceeding had been reached, could be continued by or
against the heirs of the deceased party." 8
Spanish procedural law of the eighteenth century had
progressed no further, in this respect, than a broadened application of these rules of Roman law. Particularly,
"as under Roman law, the full extent to which extinction of
actions by the death of a party was avoided could not be
seen without taking into account the effect of litis contestatio.
Under Spanish law, no pending action was extinguished by
the death of a party after litiscontestation, which was now
that stage of the proceeding when the defendant answered
the plaintiff's petition."

'4

The more mature French law of the post-revolutionary period
adopted substantive, rather than procedural, solutions of these
problems. The basic Code article on delictual and quasi-delictual
responsibility enabled the heirs of a person killed through the
fault of another to recover the damages which they sustained,
as well as those which the deceased had sustained prior to his
death. Conversely, the heirs who had accepted the wrongdoer's
succession were liable for the damages resulting from his delicts
and quasi-delicts, regardless of whether or not the wrongdoer's
estate had been enriched thereby. Rights of action and obligations ex delicto and quasi ex delicto were recognized as heritable,
and transmitted to the heirs who accepted the succession of the
obligee and obligor, respectively. 5
In the redaction of the twin Louisiana Codes of 1825, the
Livingston Committee took rather elaborate precautions to preclude the subsequent jurisprudential recognition of any of the
harsh common law rules of abatement of actions and survival of
causes of action. To accomplish this objective,
"French legal theory was utilized in both Codes, with Spanish
procedural theory additionally being relied on in the Code
of Practice. The basic substantive provision on delictual
3. Id. at 724.
4. Id. at 725.
5. Id. at 725, 726.
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and quasi-delictual responsibility was taken verbatim from
the French Civil Code. Rights of action to enforce obligations, on the death of the obligee, were transmitted to his
heirs. This rule included rights of action to enforce obligations ex delicto and quasi ex delicto. Obligations, even those
resulting from crimes, could be enforced against the heirs
who had accepted the succession of the obligor. 'Actions do
not abate by the death of one of the parties after answer
filed.' 'If after issue joined, either the plaintiff or defendant
die, it is not necessary to recommence the action; it continues between the surviving party and the heirs of the one
deceased.' "6
The hectic experience of these Code provisions and other
statutory efforts to bar any reception of common law rules of
abatement of actions in the courts of Louisiana have been told
elsewhere,7 and need not be repeated here. There is, however,
one interesting phase of the matter which has not been considered heretofore. Apparently, the redactors of the Codes failed
to notice the conflict between the French substantive theory and
the Spanish procedural theory incorporated into the Codes. The
twin articles of the Code of Practice prohibiting abatement of
the action after answer filed,8 and eliminating the necessity for
recommencing the suit if a party died after answer filed, 9 definitely implied an abatement of the action, and the necessity for
recommencing the suit, if a party died prior to the filing of an
answer. Yet a Civil Code article 10 provides that one of the effects of the right of succession is to authorize the heir to prosecute all actions which the deceased had already commenced.
This clash made itself evident in Buuck v. Fos." There,
plaintiff instituted suit to set aside a transfer of property to
the defendants primarily on the ground of fraud, and alternatively as a prohibited donation omnium bonorum. Plaintiff died
before defendants filed any pleadings, and her executrix was
substituted party plaintiff on her ex parte motion. Defendants
6. Id. at 726, 727.
7. Ibid. ; Louisiana Legislation of 1946 - Civil Procedure, 7 LOUISIANA LAW
REvIEw 36-38 (1946) ; Survey of 1954 Louisiana Legislation - Courts and Judicial Procedure, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 38, 39-42 (1954).
8. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE Art. 21 (1825), retained under the same article number in LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870.
9. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE Art. 361 (1825), retained under the same article number in LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870.
10. LA. CIVIL CODE Art. 939 (1825), now LA. CIVIL CODE Art. 945 (1870).

11. 228 La. 773, 84 So.2d 186 (1955).
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filed a "plea of abatement" and an exception of no cause of action, contending that the action had abated on the death of
plaintiff. The trial court sustained this contention, and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the judgment of dismissal was affirmed. The majority of the justices of the Supreme Court relied on the implications of the two Code of Practice articles,
and held that even if the action was heritable, it had to be recommenced by plaintiff's executrix. Two members of the court
dissented. The Chief Justice, in his dissenting opinion, pointed
out that no sound or logical reason supported any need for
recommencing the action, and that the sole effect of the majority ruling was to delay the case and impede the administration of justice. The conflicting Civil Code provision was not referred to in either opinion, but its invocation could not have
overturned the majority decision. In the event of any conflict
2
between the two Codes, the Code of Practice prevails.1
Fortunately for the administration of justice in Louisiana,
the Buuck case was short-lived as a judicial precedent. Anomalously enough, it was overruled legislatively before it was ever
decided.'
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

The most far-reaching decision affecting the Declaratory
Judgments Act yet handed down by the Supreme Court of Louisiana was its decision, during the 1954-1955 term, in Burton v.
Lester.14 There is little doubt of the soundness of the court's
decision in refusing to entertain a declaratory action under the
facts of the case. Much more questionable is the court's dictum
that the Declaratory Judgments Act may not be invoked in any
case where any other remedy is available to the plaintiffvirtually aligning Louisiana with the extreme minority rule
12. LA. R.S. 24:191 (1950). See, to the same effect, LA. R.S. §§ 514, 592
(1870).
13. While this case was pending on appeal, the Legislature amended LA. CODE
OP PRACTICE Art. 21 (1870), by La. Acts 1954, No. 57, p. 119, and LA. R.S.
13:3349 (1950) by La. Acts 1954, No. 59, p. 121, so as to provide that actions
do not abate by the death of a party after suit filed. Although the second of these
amendatory statutes provided that it would apply to "all actions now pending as
well as those -which may be hereafter instituted," the court properly refused to
give retrospective effect thereto so as to apply it to a case which had been dismissed before the effective date of the statute.
14. 227 La. 347, 79 So.2d 333 (1955). The case is discussed in The Work of
the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term - Civil Procedure, 16
LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 361, 384-85 (1956).
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that the declaratory action is an exclusive, rather than an
alternative remedy. 15
Two cases decided during the past term demonstrate the unworkability of the Burton rule. In Prince v. Hopson,16 a putative wife brought a declaratory action against the legal wife
and child of her deceased putative husband to be declared the
sole owner of certain property bought by plaintiff during her
putative marriage. The court makes it quite clear that the defendant did not invoke Burton v. Lester, saying:
"This action is evidently instituted under the Declaratory
Judgments Act. No issue is made as to the application of this
17
act by the litigants.'
The facts of the case indicate that plaintiff was in possession of
the property prior to the institution of her suit, and the opinion
states that the "defendants claim the ownership of, or an interest in, the property."' 8 Had the proven facts, or the admissions
of the litigants, gone one minute fraction of an inch further,
and showed that the defendants asserted these adverse claims to
the property prior to suit, the availability to plaintiff of the
jactitory action would have been established. Since it is most
unlikely that defendants would ever have been sued had they
not asserted such adverse claims prior to suit, we probably are
justified in assuming that the existence of another remedy was
not established simply because the defendants, like the plaintiff, preferred the declaratory action. Thus, in actual operation, the rule of the Burton case permits the parties to establish the declaratory jurisdiction of the court by consent.
This is made even more evident by Smith v. Smith. 9 There,
plaintiff sought to be declared the full owner of immovable
property purchased by her deceased mother. The defendant was
plaintiff's father, and the issue between the parties was whether
the property belonged to the community or to the separate and
paraphernal estate of plaintiff's mother. The dictum in Burton
v. Lester was invoked by defendant, but its effect was completely drawn off and dissipated by being coupled with defend15. This point is discussed in Note, 14
(1954).
16. 89 So.2d 128 (La. 1956).
17. Id. at 129, note 1.
18. Id. at 129.
19. 89 So.2d 55 (La. 1956).

LOUISIANA LAW
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ant's meritless argument that plaintiff's remedy was to apply
for the administration of her mother's succession. The real test
of the applicability of the rule of the Burton case - whether the
jactitory action was available to plaintiff- was obscured in a
haze of wishful thinking by both litigants.
"Counsel for appellee in brief and oral argument before
this court inform us that she is in actual possession of the
property, that her possession has not been disturbed, and
that her title has not been slandered, and that therefore none
of the real actions provided for in our law is available to her.
Appellant does not deny this statement. This is [apparently]
why appellant does not contend that appellee instituted this
action under the Declaratory Judgments Act as a substitute
for one of our real actions.120 (Emphasis added.)
But plaintiff's own allegations indicate that her title to the property had been slandered. According to the court's opinion, her
petition recited that the defendant "claims an undivided one-half
interest in the property on the ground that it is community property." 21 Necessarily, this claim had been asserted prior to suit.
In the great majority of declaratory actions, the rule of the
Burton case is unworkable. It is virtually impossible in many
cases for a court, and particularly an appellate court, to determine for itself whether plaintiff does or does not have another
remedy available, as this in turn depends on facts within the
power of the litigants to prove or not as they see fit. The result
is that it is the litigants, and not the court, who determine
whether declaratory jurisdiction is to be exercised. More objectionable, however, is the useless waste of time and energy
which this rule imposes upon both courts and litigants.
The foundation of the rule that the declaratory action may
not be substituted for any of the real actions is a judicial fear
that possession may thus lose its traditional role as arbiter of
the burden of proof of title. But in the great majority of cases,
there is no justification for this fear. For instance, in both of
the cases decided this term the plaintiffs were in possession
and through the jactitory action might have forced the adverse
claimants to prove valid titles to the properties. If plaintiffs
were so confident of the validity of their own titles that they
20. Id. at 57, note 1.
21. Id. at 56.
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voluntarily waived this tremendous advantage so as to have the
matter adjudicated faster and more simply in declaratory actions, why should they not be permitted to do so? The only
instance in which an involuntary prejudice might result to the
possessor through the substitution of the declaratory action for
one of the real actions is where a declaratory action to determine ownership is brought against the possessor. It might be
argued here that the plaintiff would not have to prove valid title
to the property, but only a title better than defendant's. But
here the court could very easily preserve the historic role of
possession by requiring the plaintiff to prove valid title to the
22
property.
Two simple legislative changes would solve both sets of
problems in this area: firstly, an amendment of the Declaratory
Judgments Act to provide that the "existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate" ;23 and secondly, a rule permitting possession to determine the burden of proof in all decla24
ratory actions in which the ownership of immovables is at issue.
The adoption of a Declaratory Judgments Act was delayed
for more than twenty years in Louisiana by the fear that its enactment would result in the rendition of judgments in moot or
feigned issues.25 There may have been some slight basis for a
continunce of this fear immediately after the adoption of the
Louisiana statute ;26 but in recent years our highest court has
indicated an acute awareness of this danger. Twice during the
past term, the Supreme Court of Louisiana refused to permit
22. With much less reason and justification, the court has adopted the identical requirement for actions to establish title. Cf. Dugas v. Powell, 197 La. 409,
1 So.2d 677 (1941) ; Stockstill v. Choctaw Towing Corporation, 224 La. 473, 70
So.2d 93 (1953) ; Albritton v. Childers, 225 La. 900, 74 So.2d 156 (1954). The
matter is discussed in MCMAHON, LOUISIANA PRACTICE 266-67, n. 15.1 (1956
Supp.).
23. The quoted language is taken from Rule 57, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

24. Mr. Fred Zengel of the New Orleans Bar has suggested to the Louisiana
State Law Institute that such a rule be recommended for adoption for both declaratory actions and interpleader proceedings in which the ownership of immovables is at issue. See Zengel, The Real Actions -A
TuL. L. REV. 617, 631-33 (1955).

Study in Code Revision, 29

25. See 32 LA. STATE BAR ASs'N REP. 61, 62 (1932).
26. See First Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 218 La. 9, 48 So.2d 145
(1950), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1950-1951
Procedure, 12 LOuISIANA LAW REVIEW 184, 192 (1951).
Term -Civil
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for justiciable issues presented
the statute to be invoked except
27
through adversary process.

CUMULATION OF ACTIONS

In the procedure of civilian jurisdictions joinder of actions
and parties is regulated by the rules relating to cumulation of
actions. Roughly, the counterpart of the common law concept
of joinder of actions is the objective cumulation of actions;
while, under civilian terminology, subjective cumulation of actions is the approximate analogue of the common law concept
of joinder of parties. 28 Prior to the present century, Louisiana
had solved its problems of joinder, whether of actions or of parties, by applying the Code of Practice rules governing cumulation
of actions. True, there was one large hiatus in these Code
rules - no test was provided to determine when a plurality of
plaintiffs might join in the same suit, or when a plurality of
defendants might be joined in the same proceeding. This, however, posed no problem, as early Louisiana jurisprudence supplied the workable test of "community of interest" or "common
interest. 2 9 Probably no difficulty would ever have arisen in this
area if, commencing in 1878,0 the Louisiana courts had not affected a common law accent, and come to speak of "joinder of
actions" and "joinder of parties."
In 1907, in Gill v. City of Lake Charles,8 ' the entire subject
was re-examined by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. Certainly,
the result of that case is not subject to criticism, as the court
applied the "community of interest" or "common interest" test
of the earlier Louisiana cases, and further liberalized the rule
by holding that a considerable amount of discretion to permit
27. In Tugwell v. Members of Board of Highways, 228 La. 662, 83 So.2d 893
(1955) ; State v. Board of Supervisors, 228 La. 951, 84 So.2d 597 (1955).
28. "These terms, however, do not precisely coincide with our 'joinder of actions' and 'joinder of parties,' respectively. For, on the one hand, there is usually
included under objective cumulation the combination resulting from the interposition of a counter-claim (reconventio). On the other, the union of separate demands
in favor of different plaintiffs or against different defendants, so far as permitted,
a case which in [Anglo-American] law is referred to the head of 'joinder of actions,' here, because of the plurality of parties, falls into the category of 'subjective cumulation.'" Millar, The Joinder of Actions in Continental Civil Procedure, 28 ILL. L. REV. 26, 27 (1933).
29. The subject is discussed in McMahon, Parties Litigant in Louisiana - III,
13 TUm. L. REv. 385 et seq. (1939); MOMAHON, LourIsIAA PRACTICE 379-81
(1939) ; and Comment, Substantive and ProceduralAspects of Joint, Several, and
J.oint and Several Obligations, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 828 (1954).
30. In Favrot v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 30 La. Ann. 606 (1878).
31. 119 La. 17, 43 So. 897 (1907).
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the joinder or not was vested in the trial judge. The court, however, attempted to trace the origin of the Louisiana rule which
it applied. The result was that it fell into error with respect to
two of the conclusions which it drew: (1) that Spanish procedure did not afford rules on the subject; and (2) that the
earlier Louisiana cases took these rules from the "common law
books." Since the organ of the court cited and considered no
common law cases, but only equity precedents on the subject of
multifariousness, it seems clear he intended to express the view
that the Louisiana rules on the subject were derived from chancery practice - a procedural system which, like our own Louisiana practice, was a legitimate descendant of Romano-canonical procedure. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions 82 and legal
compendia 8s twisted this into a statement that Louisiana must
look to the common law for rules to determine the joinder of
parties.
This completely erroneous paraphrase was repeated by the
court during the past term in Mundy v. Gentilly Oaks.s4 Again,
as in the Gill case, the proper result was reached through an
application of the early Louisiana jurisprudential test of community of interest. But the repetition of this erroneous statement is unfortunate. It not only contributes to loose judicial
analysis, 85 but in some instances leads to weird results.3 6
32. Dubuisson v. Long, 175 La. 564, 143 So. 494 (1932) ; Lykes Bros. Ripley
S.S. Co. v. Wiegand Marionneaux Lumber Co., 185 La. 1085, 171 So. 453 (1936).
33. See 47 CORPUS JuRis 82 (1929) ; 67 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM 961 (1950).
34. 228 La. 509, 82 So.2d 849 (1955).
35. For instance, the court speaks of "joinder of parties" in Gill v. City of
Lake Charles, 119 La. 17, 43 So. 897 (1907) ; Dubuisson v. Long, 175 La. 564, 143
So. 494 (1932) ; Lykes Bros. Ripley S.S. Co. v. Wiegand Marionneaux Lumber
Co., 185 La. 1085, 171 So. 453 (1936). Any court of a common law jurisdiction
would have characterized the problem presented in all three cases as one of joinder
of actions. It is not difficult to determine the reason for this confusion of common
law concepts. While Louisiana judges and lawyers use common law terminology,
their channelized thinking on the subject is really civilian. When a Louisianian
speaks of "joinder of parties," he actually is thinking of what the continental
jurist would term "subjective cumulation" - a plurality of parties plaintiff or
defendant. What he terms "joinder of actions" is actually the "objective cumulation" of continental procedure - the union of plural actions in the same suit by
a single plaintiff against a single defendant.
36. Had the Louisiana courts actually practiced the gospel which they preached,
and applied common law rules of joinder to the cases before them, the damage done
would have been incalculable. The only case, however, which the writer could find
where common law rules were applied is Dubuisson v. Long, 175 La. 564, 143 So.
494 (1932). There, through a confusion of the common law concepts, the court
applied a common law rule of joinder of parties to a situation involving joinder
of actions. The result reached by the Supreme Court of Louisiana there was not
only contra to that of the earlier Louisiana case of Waldo & Hughes v. Angomar,
12 La. Ann. 74 (1857), but was exactly opposite to the result which a common
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EXCEPTIONS

The last term of court produced only one case of unusual
interest involving the use of the procedural exceptions. In White
v. Lockhart,3 7 the trial court overruled the defendants' exceptions of want of interest and prescription, but maintained the
latter's exceptions to the procedural capacity of plaintiff, to
the jurisdiction of the court ratione materiae, and of right
and no cause of action. On appeal, the anomaly of the trial
court's declining jurisdiction and at the same time adjudicating
the other issues in the case was duly commented upon by the
Supreme Court. The defendants' exception to the jurisdiction
of the court ratione materiae, obviously without merit since the
suit was filed in a district court, was overruled by the appellate
court on grounds pertinent only to an issue of jurisdiction
ratione personae. Perhaps the most interesting point in the case
was the Supreme Court's holding, in overruling the defendants'
exception to plaintiff's procedural capacity, that one joint owner
of land may sue to recover all damages which he and his coowners sustained through the defendants' trespass. 8 8 The appellate court's action in refusing to consider the evidence introduced in the court below on the trial of the exception of no cause
of action, and in holding that this exception is triable only on
the face of the petition, are obviously correct. The writer, however, cannot understand why the Supreme Court made a similar
ruling on defendants' exception of no right of action, in view
of the settled jurisprudence that evidence to controvert the allegations of the petition is admissible on the trial of this exception.39
law court would have reached. Cf. Livermore v. Norfolk County, 186 Mass. 133,
71 N.E. 305 (1904), "differentiated" in Dubuisson v. Long, supra.
37. 229 La. 611, 86 So.2d 397 (1956).
38. The earlier case of Richardson v. Posey, 120 La. 223, 45 So. Ill
(1907),
so held, through application of the analogy to the Code rule relating to petitory
actions. A more valid basis for this position is afforded by the civil law rule that
an authorized mandatary may sue in his own name to enforce the rights of the
principal. The matter is discussed in McMAHoN, LOUISIANA PRACTICE 170-71

(1939), and SUPPLEMENT 36 (1956).
39. The numerous cases on this point are collected in McMAHoN, LOUISIANA
PRAcTICa 459, n. 85, 463, n. 88 (1939) and SUPPLEMENT 75, n. 84 (1956). Although the opinion does not indicate anything definitely, it is entirely possible
that the Supreme Court refused to consider the evidence introduced on the trial
of the exception of no right of action because the exception did not plead the facts
controverting the allegations of the plaintiff's petition, and plaintiff timely objected to the introduction of this evidence. Cf. Termini v. McCormick, 208 La. 221,

23 So.2d 52 (1945).
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THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE

One question of prime importance to the legal profession in
Louisiana which is left open by the adoption of the Third-Party
Practice Act 40 is whether this new procedural device may be
used to enforce generally contribution among joint tortfeasors.
An affirmative answer has been given by the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana to the very

similar question of whether such contribution might be enforced
through the use of federal third-party practice. 41 This court
holds that while procedurally Louisiana has limited the enforce-

ment of contribution among joint tortfeasors, 42 the substantive
law of the state recognizes a right to enforce such contribution ;43
and that, consequently, the federal courts in Louisiana may enforce its substantive law through federal third-party practice.
Upon the adoption of this procedural device by Louisiana in
1954, the argument was made available that the state had now

removed all of its prior procedural limitations upon the enforcement of contribution among joint tortfeasors.
In Second Church of Christ, Scientist v. Spencer4 4 the Supreme Court of Louisiana was given an opportunity to answer

this question. There, the plaintiff church sued to recover for
the damage to its pipe organ while the church building was
being renovated. Plaintiff sought to hold its general contractor
and the latter's roofing subcontractor liable solidarily for the
damage, alleging that it resulted from the joint negligence of
both. The general contractor filed a third-party petition, praying that if he be held liable to plaintiff, he have judgment over
against his roofing subcontractor. 45 After a trial of the case,
40. La. Acts 1954, No. 433, §§ 1-6, p. 809, integrated into the Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950 as Sections 3381 through 3386 of Title 13. For a discussion of
the background of this legislation, see Survey of 1954 Louisiana Legislation Courts and Judicial Procedure,15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 38, 46-49 (1954).
41. Gray v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 31 F. Supp. 299 (D.C. La.
1940) ; Id., 32 F. Supp. 335 (D.C. La. 1940) ; Shannon v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 62 F. Supp. 532 (D.C. La. 1945) ; Pucheu v. National Surety Corporation, 87 F. Supp. 558 (D.C. La. 1949). But see contra: Linkenhoger v. Owens,
181 F.2d 97, 100-02 (5th Cir. 1950).
42. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. De Jean, 185 La. 1074, 171 So. 450 (1936), 1
LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 235 (1938).
43. LA. CrvIL CODE Art. 2104 (1870) ; Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151
So. 208 (1933), 9 TUL. L. REV. 125 (1934).
44. 230 La. 432, 88 So.2d 810 (1956).
45. Thus seeking to invoke the rule that a party liable to another judicially
because of a technical or constructive fault may enforce indemnity against the
party actually at fault. Appalachian Corporation v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 151
La. 41, 91 So. 539 (1922) ; American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Gulf States U. Co.,
4 So.2d 628 (La. App. 1941), 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 451 (1942). See also St.
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the lower court held the general contractor liable for the damages claimed, but absolved the roofing contractor of any liability.
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the damage resulted
from the joint negligence of both defendants, and rendered judgment against both solidarily. However, it held that since the defendants were
"engaged in a concert of action, a common unity of purpose
and design, are joint tort-feasors, both chargeable with the
negligence in which this claim in damages finds its root, the
third-party complaint must necessarily fall.' ' 46 (Emphasis
added.)
At first blush it appears that the Supreme Court has held
that contribution among joint tortfeasors may not be enforced
through the use of third-party practice, without ever considering the argument available to support the contrary view. A
closer consideration of the case, however, suffices to dispel this
first impression. Actually, this case presents the identical situation in which contribution among joint tortfeasors could have
been enforced procedurally even prior to 1954 - where the judgment condemned both tortfeasors solidarily. Hence, all that
would be needed here to enforce contribution would be for the
general contractor to pay the full judgment, and then under
his subrogatory rights to execute the judgment against the roofing subcontractor to enforce payment of the latter's half of the
judgment. 47 So, under the precise facts of this case, a judgment
for the general contractor and against the roofing subcontractor
under third-party practice would be completely unnecessary.
The reverse is generally true. Third-party practice is necessary to enforce contribution among joint tortfeasors in the following cases: (1) when the plaintiff sues only one of the tortfeasors; (2) when plaintiff sues both, but either compromises
with one defendant or otherwise dismisses the suit as to him;
and (3) when plaintiff sues both, recovers judgment against
only one, and refuses to appeal so as to secure judgment against
both in the appellate court.4 8
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Standard Cas. & S. Co., 3 So.2d 463 (La. App.
1941).
46. 88 So.2d 814-15 (La. 1956).
47. As permitted in Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933), 9
TuL. L. REv. 125 (1934).
48. When plaintiff seeks a solidary judgment against two defendants, and does
not appeal from a judgment absolving one, the defendant condemned may not
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APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Most of the cases on this subject decided during the past
term involved only the application of trite procedural principles.
There was the usual bountiful harvest of cases transferred to
the intermediate appellate courts because of the failure of the
record of appeal to establish affirmatively the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.40 In two cases5 ° money judgments largely
in excess of the minimum jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
were demanded, but the cases were transferred because the
claims were palpably inflated, and the maximum judgments
which could be rendered would be below this jurisdictional
minimum.
Several rulings of the Supreme Court, made in previous years
in the effort to reduce the volume of cases coming to that court,
were reiterated during the past term. Thus, it was again held
that an intermediate appellate court has no power to remand a
case to the trial court to establish the facts necessary to determine appellate jurisdiction, after the Supreme Court has transferred the case to the intermediate appellate court.51 The court
twice refused to consider an affidavit filed in the appellate
court, establishing the facts showing the value of the right or
property in dispute.5 2 The rule that the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to review a trial court's interpretation of a statute,
where there is no question of the unconstitutionality or invalidity
appeal from the judgment so as to review the issue of the liability of his co-defend-

ant to the plaintiff. Rumpf v. Callo, 16 La. App. 12, 132 So. 763 (1931) ; Thaiheim v. Suhren, 18 La. App. 46, .37 So. 874 (1931) ; Spanja v. Thibodaux Boiler
Works, 37 So.2d 615 (La. App. 1948). Cf. Reid v. Monticello, 215 La. 444, 40
So.2d 814 (1949), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1948-1949 Term - Civil Procedure, 10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 237, 246-48

(1949).
49. Diecidue v. Kilpatrick, 228 La. 1004, 84 So.2d 801 (1955) ; Winsberg v.
Winsberg, 229 La. 61, 85 So.2d 31 (1956) ; Attaway v. Melton, 229 La. 113, 85
So.2d 50 (1956) ; Hunter v. Hussey, 229 La. 151, 85 So.2d 246 (1956) ; Goins v.
Gates, 229 La. 740, 86 So.2d 691 (1956) ; Howard v. Howard, 230 La. 52, 87 So.2d

726 (1956) ; Moran v. Douglas, 230 La. 150, 88 So.2d 8 (1956) ; Russ v. Stephens,
89 So.2d 213 (La. 1956).
50. Griffin v. Bank of Abbeville & Trust Co., 228 La. 857, 84 So.2d 437
(1955) ; Des Ormeaux v. Dufour, 229 La. 287, 85 So.2d 518 (1956).

51. Succession of Jenkins, 230 La. 367, 88 So.2d 659 (1956). This rule is discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term-

Civil Procedure, 16 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 361, 372 (1956).
52. In Johnson v. Nora, 228 La. 603, 83 So.2d 643 (1955) ; Russ v. Stephens,
89 So.2d 213 (La. 1956). This rule is criticized vigorously in The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term ANA LAW REVIEW 198, 209-12 (1953).
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of the legislation and less than two thousand dollars is involved,
58
was again applied.
During the past term the Supreme Court had several opportunities to "apply" its rule that appellate jurisdiction of injunction cases is determined by the value of the right in contest 54 - a
formula so nebulous that its principal value consists in its application in cases where no effort has beeen made to establish
this value. 55 In past years, the court has often applied the "defendant viewpoint rule" in determining appellate jurisdiction
of injunction cases. The loss which defendant would suffer if
the injunction were granted, or what it would cost him to comply
therewith, has been considered the "value of the right in contest." 56 One of the cases decided during the past term appears
to herald the exit of this rule. In State ex rel. Claibornev. Distefano,57 defendants appealed to the Supreme Court from a judgment decreeing the invalidity of the incorporation of a village,
and enjoining defendants- members of its governing body from levying or assessing any taxes. To establish affirmatively
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in the court
below defendants had proven that the injunction would prevent
defendant village from levying annual taxes of more than
$7,000.00. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held it lacked jurisdiction, and transferred the appeal to the proper court of appeal.
Two reasons - both of which appear highly questionable to the
writer - were relied on primarily to support the action of the
court. First, it was held that the injunction was purely incidental to the demand for decreeing the invalidity of the incorporation of the village, and as the court would have had no appellate jurisdiction over the latter alone, it had none over the
53. Peters v. Cooper, 230 La. 173, 88 So.2d 16 (1956), following State Farm
Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Ott, 221 La. 1061, 61 So.2d 872 (1952), 14 LouIsIANA
LAW REVIEW 276 (1953), which overruled Downs v. Dunn, 162 La. 747, 111 So.
82 (1926).
54. Johnson v. Nora, 228 La. 603, 83 So.2d 64a (1955) ; Sixth Baptist Church
of New Orleans v. Cincore, 228 La. 769, 84 So.2d 185 (1955) ; Ragusa v. American Metal Works, 229 La. 440, 86 So.2d 95 (1956) ; State ex rel. Claiborne v.
Distefano, 229 La. 1098, 87 So.2d 705 (1956).
55. As in Johnson v. Nora, 228 La. 603, 83 So.2d 643 (1955) ; Sixth Baptist
Church of New Orleans v. Cincore, 228 La. 769, 84 So.2d 185 (1955) ; Ragusa v.
American Metal Works, 229 La. 440, 86 So.2d 95 (1956) ; City of Lake Charles
v. Fungay, 230 La. 393, 88 So.2d 706 (1956).
56. Murff v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 180 La. 664, 157 So. 383 (1934)
Frierson v. Cooper, 196 La. 450, 199 So. 388 (1940), 1 LoYOLA L. REV. 110
(1941). See also New Orleans v. La Nasa, 227 La. 953, 81 So.2d 7 (1955). Of.
State ex rel. Chandler v. Shreveport, 151 La. 491, 91 So. 850 (1922) ; New Orleans & Northeastern R. Co. v. Redmann, 210 La. 525, 27 So.2d 321 (1946).
57. 229 La. 1098, 87 So.2d 705 (1956).
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injunction. This appears to the writer to be merely a play on

confused terminology. 8 Second, the court held that
"However, no levies have been effected, and it would not

be correct to say that the requisite jurisdictional amount can
be ascertained from problematical acts of the municipality's
officials." 9
Apparently, the court only half believes the old saw that in this
life the only certainties are death and taxes.

Determination of the "amount in dispute" in a suit for an
accounting would appear to present considerable difficulty. In

a very real sense, if at the time the case is submitted to the
trial court for a decision plaintiff in good faith contends that he
is entitled to an accounting, and that the latter will show that
defendant is indebted to him for $3,000.00, it can be said that
the "amount in dispute" is that amount. Yet, on the other hand,
the action is not brought primarily for the recovery of a money
judgment; and it is only when an accounting has been ordered
resulting in a judgment for plaintiff that the "value of the
right in contest" can be gauged with complete accuracy. During
the last term this latter alternative was adopted by the Supreme

Court, which held that "the matter of appellate jurisdiction of
this court can only attach in cases wherein an accounting has
been ordered and judgment has been entered for an amount in

excess of $2,000.00."60
APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Only final judgments, and interlocutory orders causing irreparable injury, are appealable. 61 During the past term, two ap58. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 1, inter alia, provides: "In all cases where there is
an appeal from a judgment on a reconventional or other incidental demand, the
appeal shall lie to the court having jurisdiction of the main demand. If there be
no right of appeal on the main demand, the appeal shall lie to the court having
jurisdiction of the reconventional demand." (Emphasis added.) This obviously
has no application to a case where the plaintiff asserts a single cause of action
with plural prayers for relief.
If the Supreme Court persists in applying this rule, for all practical purposes
it will eliminate all injunction cases from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
59. 229 La. 1098, 1104, 87 So.2d 705, 707 (1956). The court also refused to
accept the amount of the annual taxes which defendant village was enjoined from
collecting on the ground that since it would have to spend a major portion of these
anticipated tax receipts in providing services for its inhabitants, the gross figure
could not be accepted as the value of the right in contest. The writer finds it even
harder to accept this reasoning.
60. Goins v. Gates, 229 La. 740, 744, 86 So.2d 691, 693 (1956). See, to the
same effect: Winsberg v. Winsberg, 229 La. 61, 85 So.2d 31 (1956).
61. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE Arts. 565, 566 (1870).
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peals were dismissed on the ground that they constituted appeals
from interlocutory orders causing no irreparable injury. In
one,62 the interlocutory judgment appealed from was an order
for the judicial sequestration of all books, vouchers, and records
of a business in a suit for an accounting. In the other,68 the
judgment merely overruled the defendant's exception of possession in a jactitory action.
One question which has always caused difficulty to the appellate courts of Louisiana is what can be brought up for review
by the appellee's answer to the appeal.6 4 While the numerous
cases on the subject are in conflict, the later and better-reasoned
decisions hold that the appeal brings up to the appellate court
the entire judgment, and any issue in the case decided adversely
to the appellee in the court below may be reviewed on appeal
under the appellee's answer to the appeal. 65 In Breaux v. Laird66
two of the items of damage claimed by the plaintiff were rejected when the trial court struck the plaintiff's supplemental
petition from the record. Subsequently, on the trial, judgment
was rendered for plaintiff on the other items of damage claimed.
Plaintiff answered defendants' appeal, praying that the action
of the trial court in striking the supplemental petition be reversed, and that the case be remanded for further trial on the
items of damage claimed therein. Appellants moved to strike
this answer to the appeal, contending that the appeal was only
from the judgment rendered on the merits. This motion to strike
was overruled, and the Supreme Court held that defendants'
appeal brought up the entire judgment, and the answer to the
appeal properly presented for review the trial court's action in
striking the supplemental petition. This ruling appears to be
eminently sound. The trial court's order striking the supplemental petition was purely an interlocutory order causing no
irreparable injury, which could not be appealed. It could be re67
viewed only on an appeal from the final judgment.
62. Weilbacher v. Jee, 229 La. 817, 86 So.2d 916 (1956).
63. Stockstill v. Cotten, 230 La. 205, 88 So.2d 27 (1956).
64. The cases on the subject are collected in MCMAHiON, LOUISIANA PRACTICE
1021-26 (1939) and SUPPLEMENT 194-95 (1956).
65. See supporting cases cited ibid.
66. 230 La. 221, 88 So.2d 33 (1956).
67. Cf. Bossier's Heirs v. Hollingsworth & Jackson, 117 La. 221, 41 So. 553
(1906) ; Trcka v. Bragmans Bluff Lumber Co., 168 La. 805, 123 So. 332 (1929) ;
Louisiana Southern Ry. v. Board of Levee Com'rs. 169 La. 475, 125 So. 453
(1929).
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The delay for applying for a rehearing in the appellate courts
68
in cases appealed from the district courts is fourteen days.
With respect to the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal for the
Parish of Orleans, this delay commences to run the day after
the rendition of judgment by the appellate court. But a constitutional provision requires that, in the Courts of Appeal for the
First and Second Circuits, notice of all judgments rendered must
be given to counsel of record, and provides that no "delay shall
run until such notice shall have been given."6 9 In two cases decided during the past term, 70 the Supreme Court held that, insofar as these two intermediate courts were concerned, the fourteen-day delay for applying for a rehearing commenced to run
the day after receipt of this notice of judgment by counsel for the
applicant.
CONSERVATORY WRITS

In the injunction procedure adopted in the Code of Practice
of 1825, and retained in the 1870 revision, there was no requirement that the applicant for injunctive relief be threatened with
immediate and irreparable injury. The Code enumerated a number of mandatory grounds for the issuance of injunctive relief,71
and additionally granted the courts discretion to grant injunctive relief to preserve property during the pendency of the action, and to prevent the defendant "from doing some other act
injurious to the other party. ' 72 When the act prohibited by the
injunction would not cause irreparable injury to the plaintiff,
the court was empowered to dissolve the injunction upon defendant posting a bond to protect the plaintiff against damage. 78
This injunction procedure, with its injunction pendente lite
issuing on ex parte application and usually in effect until the
trial of the case on its merits, worked so unsatisfactorily 74 that
in 1924 the Legislature adopted the present interlocutory in68. La. Acts 1954, No. 51, § 1, amending and re-enacting LA. R.S. 13:4446
(1950).
69. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 24.
70. Mid-State Tile Company v. Chaudoir, 228 La. 634, 83 So.2d 654 (1955);
Reeves v. Department of Highways, 229 La. 653, 83 So.2d 889 (1955).
71. Arts. 298, 300-303, LA. CODES OF PRACTICE of 1825 and 1870. See also Articles 738 through 740.
72. Art. 303, LA. CODES OF PRACTICE of 1825 and 1870.
73. Art. 307, LA. CODES OF PRACTICE of 1825 and 1870.
74. In this connection, see Spencer, Discussion of Act 29 of 1924, Relating to
Writs of Injunction, 26 LA. BaR AsS'N REP. 15 (1925). See also American Nat.
Bank v. Bauman, 173 La. 336, 137 So. 54 (1931).
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junctive practice, 75 modeled upon that in use in the federal
courts. Under it, the trial judge cannot issue either a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, unless the
plaintiff is threatened with immediate and irreparable injury.
In Powell v. Cox 76 plaintiff obtained a rule upon defendant
to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue,
and a temporary restraining order was issued, prohibiting defendant from trespassing upon property formerly occupied by
defendant under a lease from plaintiff. Defendant then moved
to dissolve the temporary restraining order; and on the hearing,
this order was dissolved, conditioned upon defendant furnishing
bond for $2,000.00 within ten days. The trial court further dismissed plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction, conditioned upon defendant furnishing the surety bond required
for the dissolution of the temporary restraining order; and in
default of such bond, the court ordered that the preliminary
injunction issue. Under its supervisory jurisdiction the Supreme
Court held the action of the trial court unauthorized, and set
aside its judgment. This action appears completely sound. Interlocutory injunctive relief can no longer be granted except to
prevent immediate and irreparable injury to the plaintiff, and
under the pertinent Code provision, an injunction can be bonded
only if the act prohibited will not cause irreparable injury.
The only other injunction case decided by the court during
the past term involved only the adequacy of the allegations of
the petition for injunctive relief. In keeping with the present
trend towards a liberality of procedure, the Supreme Court resolved the doubts in favor of plaintiff and held the allegations
77
sufficient.
75. La. Acts 1924, No. 29, §§ 1-6, p. 39, integrated into the Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950 as Sections 4062 through 4071 of Title 13.
76. 228 La. 703, 83 So.2d 908 (1955).
77. Green v. Brawley, 228 La. 850, 84 So.2d 434 (1955). Plaintiff and defendant originally had been sued solidarily on a promissory note by a bank. After
default judgment against plaintiff, defendant had paid off the amount due, and

then sought to enforce the judgment against plaintiff. The latter sought injunctive
relief to prevent execution of the judgment, alleging that the parties were members
of a partnership, and that the note had been issued on a "partnership obligation."
After issuance of a temporary restraining order, defendant moved to dissolve it
and recall the rule for a preliminary injunction, on the ground that the petition

for injunction stated no cause of action. The trial court dissolved the temporary
restraining order and recalled its rule for the preliminary injunction, holding the
petition inadequate. Under its supervisory jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the allegations sufficient.
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Judicial sequestration was employed in a novel manner in
Weilbaecher v. Jee.7 8 There, plaintiff sued on a written contract
under which plaintiff would receive one-third of the net profits
of a contracting business operated by defendant. Plaintiff further prayed for an accounting, and for a rule for the defendant
to show cause why an expert should not be appointed by the court
to audit the books to determine the amount due plaintiff. To
insure the ability of the expert to examine these books, plaintiff prayed that they be sequestered judicially, and held pending
further orders of the court. The judicial sequestration was ordered, and the court appointed the sheriff judicial sequestrator.
On appeal this interlocutory judgment was affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the slight inconvenience resulting to defendant in being temporarily deprived of his books was not sufficiently prejudicial to justify a dissolution of the judicial sequestration.
THE JACTITORY ACTION

"In these actions, also known as actions of slander of
title, 'The defendant may deny the possession [of plaintiff],
or he may deny the slander, thereby waiving title; or he may
admit the slander and claim title in himself, in which event
the action is converted into a petitory one, with the defendant
sustaining the burden of affirmative proof of his alleged
title, as a plaintiff.' The issue of plaintiff's lack of a requisite
possession might have been raised in several ways. If there
was a deficiency of allegation in the petition, it might have
been tendered through the exception of want of possession,
or by exceptions of no right and no cause of action, and disposed of preliminarily by a trial of the exceptions. If the
allegations of the petition were sufficient on this point,
theoretically the issue of plaintiff's possession might be presented by the exception of want of possession; but as a practical matter, no advantage was gained by defendant thereby,
as the courts would not try the factual issue presented by the
exception preliminarily, but would refer the exception to the
trial on the merits. Usually, the issue of plaintiff's possession was raised through the answer's denial of plaintiff's
allegations, and disposed of at the trial of the case on its
merits.
78. 229 La. 817, 86 So.2d 916 (1956).
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"Act 241 of 1946 ' modifies this procedure by requiring
that the issue of plaintiff's possession (whether in fact or
as a result of deficiency of the petitioner's allegations) be
raised by an exception filed in limine litis; and providing
that, unless so presented, such will be waived upon joinder
of issue." 0
The 1946 legislation is well drafted and quite concise. It has
no language prohibiting an appeal from the judgment of the
trial court overruling the exception of want of possession for
the very simple reason that this would have been unnecessary.
It is settled that an order overruling an exception is an interlocutory judgment which causes no irreparable injury to the defendant, and hence is not appealable. 8 ' It is also well settled that
an unappealable interlocutory judgment may be reviewed only on
8 2
the appeal taken from the final judgment.
3
In Stockstill v. Cotten"
defendant attempted to take an appeal from the judgment of the trial court overruling his exception of want of possession. This appeal was dismissed by the
Supreme Court on motion of plaintiff, on the ground that the
order appealed from was an interlocutory judgment causing no
irreparable injury. Under the prior jurisprudence, this point
was so well settled that its mere statement by the court should
have sufficed; but the Supreme Court apparently felt that additional argument was needed to sustain its position, and added
the following dictum:

"It is true that in an action in jactitation the question of
possession, as well as of slander and sometimes of damages,
is important in a determination of the merits. It is also true,
however, that a plaintiff's right to resort to such a suit depends on his having the requisite possession. And it is the
matter of the right to sue and proceed (not of the real merits
of the case) that the above quoted statute obviously addresses
itself, for as its language discloses that which is thereby re79. Now LA. R.S. 13:5063, 5064
(1950).
80. Louisiana Legislation of 1 946-Civil Procedure,7 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEw
36, 3940 (1946).
81. Howard v. Cox, 7 Mart.(N.S.) 102 (La. 1828) ; Richardson v. Ledbetter,
14 La. 156 (1839) ; Feitel v. Feitel, 169 La. 384, 125 So. 280 (1929) ; Rapides
Cent. Ry. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 207 La. 870, 22 So.2d 200 (1945) ; Woodcock
v. Crehan, 28 So.2d 61 (La. App. 1946).
82. See cases cited in note 67 supra.
83. 230 La. 205, 88 So.2d 27 (1956).
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quired to be raised by an exception filed in limine litis is
'lack of sufficient possession of the property involved therein
by the plaintiff or plaintiffs to institute and prosecute such
action.' (Court's emphasis.)
"When such an exception is filed, heard and overruled (as
occurred in this case) the defendant can then answer, setting
up his real defenses or converting the suit into a petitory
action, after which the cause is to be tried on its merits. Of
course, at the trial plaintiff, as above shown, will be required
to prove the possession which he seeks to protect; however,
in making the proof the evidence adduced on the hearing of
the exception may be offered and introduced, just as was done
in Ware v. Baucum, 221 La. 259, 59 So.2d 182."184
The court's differentiation between proof of possession to
establish plaintiff's right to institute and prosecute the action,
and proof of possession on the trial of the merits of the case is
quite apt to cause difficulty in the future; and in the writer's
opinion, runs counter to the legislative intent in adopting the
1946 legislation. No damage will be done when, as in Ware v.
Baucum, supra, the defendant files an exception of want of possession in limine, and on the trial of the case on its merits both
parties re-offer the evidence as to possession introduced on the
trial of the exception. But suppose the defendant, on the trial of
the merits of the case, offers additional evidence on this issue evidence which he did not offer on the trial of the exception.
Should the trial court accept it over plaintiff's objection? Suppose, also, that defendant did not file an exception of want of
possession in limine, but merely denied plaintiff's allegation of
possession, and on the trial of the case on its merits defendant
offered evidence to show that plaintiff did not have requisite possession. Should the trial court permit the introduction of this
evidence over plaintiff's objection? If the answers to these questions are in the affirmative, then the Legislature in 1946 did not
accomplish what the profession has assumed it accomplished.
In the only other case involving the jactitory action decided
during the past term, the court affirmed an earlier ruling of considerable importance in mineral law.
One of the difficulties incident to the use of the jactitory
action in mineral cases lies in the fact that, in the strictest sense,
84. 88 So.2d at 29.
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there can be no physical possession of a mineral right. The problem presented, however, was solved through application of Article 3432 of the Civil Code,8 5 resulting in the general rule that
the possessor of the surface of the land may maintain a jactitory
action against one who slanders his possession by claiming mineral rights in the land. One important exception to this general
rule, announced in International Paper Co. v. Louisiana Central
Lumber Co., 6 is that if the slanderer holds a recorded mineral
servitude, the jactitory action may not be maintained unless
plaintiff establishes the prescription of this servitude through
8 7
non-user. This exception was affirmed during the past term.
SUCCESSION PROCEDURE
Three cases involving points of succession appellate procedure
were decided during the past term. In one88 the court reiterated
the rule that an order of the district court requiring the administrator of a succession to file his account was an interlocutory
judgment which caused the administrator no irreparable injury,
and hence was unappealable. In the second 9 a person who had
opposed unsuccessfully the surviving widow's application to be
appointed administrator took a devolutive appeal from the judgment rejecting the opposition. While the appeal was pending, the
opponent, a brother of the deceased, sold all of his right, title,
and interest in the succession to a third party. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court properly sustained the administratrix's motion to dismiss the appeal.
The point involved in the third of these cases - Succession
of Roth ° - is much more important, and the positions taken by
the Supreme Court much more difficult to defend. There, the
court held an appeal from an order of the district court dismissing an opposition to the probate of an olographic testament, and
permitting the person named therein as testamentary executor
to qualify in due course, suspended the execution of the judgment.
85. Reading in part: "The possession of incorporeal rights, such as servitudes
and other rights of that nature, is only a quasi possession, and is exercised by the

species of possession of which these rights are susceptible."
86. 202 La. 621, 12 So.2d 659 (1943).
87. In Jantz v. Long Bell Petroleum Company, 229 La. 821, 86 So.2d 918
(1956). This and other aspects of the matter are discussed in Comment, Possesajon of Minerals, to appear in a subsequent issue of the Review.

88. Succession of Willis v. Willis, 229 La. 293, 85 So.2d 520 (1956).
89. Succession of Alstock, 230 La. 167, 88 So.2d 14 (1956).
90. 230 La. 33, 87 So.2d 719 (1956).
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Article 1059 of the Code of Practice provides that no appeal from
an order appointing or removing a "tutor or curator of a minor,
interdicted or absent person, or of a vacant succession of absent
heirs, or other administratorsof such successions" shall suspend
the execution of the judgment.9 1 This Code provision has been
held consistently to prevent a suspensive appeal from a judgment
appointing or removing a testamentary executor.9 2 In the instant case, the Supreme Court held the article inapplicable for
two reasons. Firstly, it was held that the appeal there was not
from an order appointing an executor, but rather from the judgment dismissing appellant's opposition and permitting the testamentary executor to qualify by taking his oath. This difference
is a mere play on words.98 Secondly, the court held that the rationale for the Code provision was to prevent injury to the heirs
through want of an administrator, and here the trial court had
appointed an administrator pro tempore to act until the matter
was finally settled. This contention appears rather lame to the
writer. Certainly, the authority of an administrator pro tempore
terminates when the testamentary executor named in the will
qualifies.
ABANDONMENT OF ACTIONS

The basic Code article on the subject provides that if a plaintiff takes no active step in the prosecution of his suit for a period
94
of five years, the action is presumed to have been abandoned.
This is not a conclusive presumption, as it has been recognized
that it may be rebutted by plaintiff establishing either: (1)
waiver by defendant of his right to treat the action as abandoned
91. See also to much the same effect: LA. CODE OF PRACTICE Art. 580 (1870).
92. State ex rel. Commagere v. Judge, 22 La. Ann. 116 (1870) ; Succession of
Lefort, 139 La. 51, 71 So. 215, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 769 (1916) ; Succession of Beattie, 163 La. 831, 112 So. 802 (1926). See also Succession of Townsend, 37 La.
Ann. 405, 409 (1885) ; State ex rel. Byrnes v. Somerville, 110 La. 734, 738, 34 So.
757, 758 (1903).
93. In testamentary successions the court never "appoints" the testamentary
executor, except where none is named in the testament, or the one named is dead
or will not accept the trust, and the court is compelled to appoint a dative testamentary executor. Except in the latter cases all that the court does is to probate
the testament and confirm the person named in the testament as executor by permitting him to qualify by taking his oath of office. The appeal here was from the
same type of judgment as in Succession of Beattie, 163 La. 831, 112 So. 802
(1926), where the Supreme Court applied the Code provisions and held that the
appeal could not be suspensive.
94. LA. Civm CODE Art. 3519 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1954, No. 615,
§ 1, p. 1119. The development of the Louisiana rule is traced in Survey of 1954
Louisiana Legislation-Courtsand JudicialProcedure,15 LOuIsIANA LAw REVIEW
38, 42-44 (1954). See also Comment, The Abandonment of a Suit--Its Effect on
Prescription,22 TuL. L. REV. 504 (1948).
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by his taking any procedural action inconsistent with an intent
to treat the action as abandoned ;95 or (2) plaintiff's inaction was
due to causes beyond his control.9 6 Initially, there were no procedural obstacles to a rebuttal of the presumption of abandon-

ment, as the earlier cases held that the Code provision was not
self-operative, and that defendant must move to have the action
dismissed on the ground of abandonment.9 7 Hence, plaintiff
might oppose this motion and rebut the presumption of abandonment on one or the other of the two grounds mentioned above.
More recently, however, the Louisiana courts have reversed their
position, and have held that on plaintiff's failure to take any step
in the prosecution of his suit for a period of five years, the suit
is ipso facto dismissed, without any necessity for defendant to

move for the dismissal 5 This rule had one very practical advantage,9 9 but it left some doubt as to whether the presumption
of abandonment had not been made conclusive; and if not, the
proper procedure to employ to rebut this presumption.
The open question on the subject was answered by the Supreme Court during the past term in State ex rel. Shields v.
1 °
Southport Petroleum Corporation.
0 There, plaintiff resisted de-

95. Geisenberger v. Cotton, 116 La. 651, 40 So. 929 (1906); Continental
Supply Co. v. Fisher Oil Co., 156 La. 101, 100 So. 64 (1924); Hibernia Bank
& Trust Co. v. J. M. Dresser Co., 14 La. App. 555, 131 So. 752 (1930); King
v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 143 So. 95 (La. App. 1932) ; Harrisonburg-Catahoula
State Bank v. Meyers, 185 So. 96 (La. App. 1938), 13 TUL. L. REV. 641 (1939).
See also State v. United Dredging Co., 218 La. 744, 747-48, 50 So.2d 826, 827
(1951).
96. Barton v. Burbank, 138 La. 997, 71 So. 134 (1916) ; Cotonio v. Richardson, 4 Orl. App. 280 (La. App. 1907); Bell v. Staring, 170 So. 502 (La. App.
1936) ; Metairie Bank in Liquidation v. Lecler, 1 So.2d 710 (La. App. 1941). Cf.
Sliman v. Araguel, 196 La. 859, 200 So. 280 (1941). See also HarrisonburgCatahoula State Bank v. Meyers, 185 So. 96, 97 (La. App. 1938), 13 TuL. L. REV.
641 (1939).
97. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. J. M. Dresser Co., 14 La. App. 555, 131
So. 752 (1930). Cf. Harrisonburg-Catahoula State Bank v. Meyers, 185 So. 96,
97 (La. App. 1938), 13 TUL. L. REV. 641 (1939).
98. Senseley v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co., 205 La. 61, 16 So.2d 906 (1944)
Evans v. Hamner, 209 La. 442, 23 So.2d 814 (1946), discussed in The Work of
the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term-Procedure, 7 LoUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 262, 270 (1946) ; State v. United Dredging Co., 218 La. 744, 50
So.2d 826 (1951) ; Sandfield Oil & Gas Co. v. Paul, 7 So.2d 725 (La. App.
1942).
99. To title examiners. In many instances suits involving title to immovables
are filed, 1i8 penden8 recorded, and then abandoned. Counsel for plaintiff withdraw from the case, plaintiffs die or drift away to parts unknown, and procedurally it may be extremely difficult to file any contradictory motion to have
the suit dismissed. Under the more recent cases, this is not necessary, as the
suit is dismissed ipso facto.
100. 230 La. 199, 88 So.2d 25 (1956). The identical point was presented, and
the identical answer given, in a companion suit decided by the Court of Appeal
for the Parish of Orleans-State ex rel. Shields v. Southport Petroleum Corporation, 78 So.2d 201 (La. App. 1955), 16 LOUiSIANA LAW REVIEW 199.
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fendant's motion to dismiss the suit as abandoned on the ground
of defendant's waiver of his right to treat the action as abandoned. The trial court, probably because of the latest decisions
holding the Code provision self-operative, dismissed the suit.
The Supreme Court reversed, expressly approving the more recent decisions, but holding that defendant had waived its right
to have the suit dismissed as abandoned. This case clears up the
doubt as to the rebuttable nature of the Code presumption, but
it does not supply the answer as to how this presumption may be
rebutted procedurally. In the Shields case, defendant had moved
to dismiss the suit, and plaintiff had ample opportunity to oppose
this rule and show that defendant's right to have the suit dismissed had been waived. How can the presumption of abandonment be rebutted, however, when the defendant does not move to
dismiss, but relies upon the rule that the Code provision is selfoperative, and the suit is dismissed ipso facto upon plaintiff's
failure to prosecute during a period of five years?10 1
After extended consideration and considerable debate, the
Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute has recommended
the adoption of an article, in the proposed new Code of Practice,
which will go far towards providing a solution for the procedural
problems presented,'10 2 but it does not appear to the writer to present a complete solution, 103 and it retains the present requirement of five years of inaction. This is entirely too long a period
for this driftwood to be allowed to accumulate in our trial
courts.
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101. Perhaps the solution would be for plaintiff to rule defendant into court
to show cause why the action should not be decreed as not abandoned, whenever
plaintiff learns that defendant is taking the position that the suit has been dismissed ipso facto.
102. Article 18 of Civil Actions: "An action is abandoned when the parties
thereto, prior to judgment, fail to take any bona fide step in the prosecution
or defense thereof for a period of five years. This provision shall be operative
without formal order, but on ex parte motion of any party or other interested
person the court shall enter a formal order of dismissal as of the date of its
abandonment." LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF PRACTICE REVISION,
Exposi DES MOTIFS No. 5, at 64 (1954).

103. It leaves open the question of how the presumption of abandonment may
he rebutted when plaintiff claims that his inactivity was due to causes beyond
his control. Compare the cases cited in note 96 supra.
104. What appears to the writer to be a much more effective solution of the
problem is provided for in the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Louisiana. There, the clerk clears the docket of the court semi-annually by
notifying counsel in all cases where no proceedings have been taken within six
months that they must appear and show why the action should not be dismissed
for want of prosecution. See GENERAL, CIVIL AND ADMIRALTY RULES, UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA, Rule 12
(1944), 8 FED. RULES SERv. 978 (1945), quoted in Note, 16 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 199, 202, n. 16 (1955).

